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Abstract 
This paper  analyzes  the choice of monetary instrument in a stochastic two country setting 
where each  country's set of monetary policy  instruments includes both the money  supply and the 
interest rate, It shows how the optimal choice of  instrument is determined in two stages. First, for 
each pair, the minimum welfare cost for each economy  is determined. This defines a pair of payoff 
matrices and the second stage involves determining the Nash equilibrium for this bimatrix game. 
In our illustrative example for the alternative shocks considered, a dominant Nash equilibrium  is 
always obtained. 
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The question of the optimal choice  of monetary instrument was  First  introced nto:ae 
macrostabilization literature by  Poole  (1970) and has been  extensively  discussed  since,  The ey 
conclusioh  is that in a world of uncertainty, the superiority of the money  stock or Interest rate 
as the operating target depends upon the sources of the stochastic disturbances impnging on the 
economy. 
A crucial  assumption underlying this literature is the presence of only a single policy  maker. 
Poole's  original analysis, and much of the derivative work, deals with a closed economy, in which 
this assumption is the obvious one.  Likewise, the international extensions are typically to small 
open economies,  in which the policy  maker  can ignore the repercussions  of his actions on the rest 
of the world. However, much of the recent work in international  monetary policy  stresses the in- 
creasing interdependence between econorrues and policy making. Disturbances and policy  actions 
occurring in one country exert influences abroad, thereby inducing  policy  reactions. which in turn 
feed  back  on the first economy.  Monetary policy  therefore involves  important strategic consid- 
erations.  Beginning  with early work by Hamada (1976),  more recent authors such as Carizoneri 
and Gray (1985) and others have analyzed strategic monetary policy under alternative behavioral 
assumptions. 
The present paper analyzes the choice  of monetary instrument in a stochastic two—country 
setting.  As will become evident, the nature of the monetary instrument in a two country envi- 
ronment is of second order of dimensionality.  Specifically, each country's set of policy instruments 
includes both the money  supply and the interest rate.  The monetary instrument problem there- 
fore involves assessing welfares in situations where the monetary authorities choose to set dl1erent 
policy instruments, as  well as in cases where the same instrument is selected. These various  combi- 
nations of  instrument choice give rise to a pair of 2 x 2 payoff matrices in welfare costs and we treat 
the monetary instrument problem as being to determine the equilibrium outcome to this bimatrix 
game. 
1 2.  THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
The analysis is  based  on a two country stochastic macroeconomic  model,  in  wh:tb  both 
economies  are subject to real and nominal disturbances and expectations are rational  In or 
der to maximize  analytical tractability, the simplest  such model  is used. SpeciOcally. we consider 
two identical economies,  each producing a common traded good and trading a single common bond. 
Purchasing power  parity (PPP) and uncovered  interest parity are therefore assumed  to hold.  In 
deviation form, the model is expressed by the following equations: 
= P + E 
Y +Y = d1( +Y) -  - ((P+1)  P]  0< d <1 
d2>0 
Me—Pt=criYt—aJt+v  n>0,  cs5>0 
M—P=1Y —nI±v 
= J  ((E1)  - 
Y =[P -e1(P)i+w. 
1? =  - (1(P±  w 
where 
Y = Real output  in logarithms, measured as a deviation about its natural rate level, 
P =  price of  domestic output, expressed  in logarithms, 
E = exchange  rate (measured in terms of units of domestic currency per unit of foreign  currency), 
expressed in logarithms, 
I = nominal interest rate, expressed in natural units, 
M = nominal money supply, expressed  in logarithms. 
2 = expectation, conditioned on information at time t, 
Ut  =  stochastic disturbance in the world demand for output. 
vt =  stochastic disturbance in the demand for money. 
=  stochastic disturbance in supply. 
Domestic  variables are unstarred; foreign variables are denoted with asterisks, 
Equation (1) describes purchasing  power parity  assumed to hold between  domestic and foreign 
goods.  Equation (2) describes  equilibrium  in the world goods market, where world  demand depends 
upon world  output, the real interest rates in the two economies,  and the stochastic disturbance 
in demand,  The money  market equilibrium conditions n the  two  countries are standard  and 
described by  (3)  and  (3')  respectively.  The perfect substitutability between  domest,c and foreign 
bonds is described by the interest parity condition (4).  Finally,  equations 5}  and  (5')  describe 
outputs in the two economies  in terms of standard Lucas 5UPiY functions: the dev:ation n output 
from its natural  rate is postulated to be a positive function of the unanticipated movement  in 
the price of output, together with the stochastic disturbance in supply. The stochastic variables, 
Ut,V,Wt,W, are assumed to be independently distributed with zero means and finite variances, 
denoted by  etc.  If, in addition, as in fact turns out to be the case, the optimal choices  of 
policy instruments are fixed over time, then, as is well known, the rational expectations solution to 
the system (1)  (5) implies that expectations for all future periods are constant, With the system 
specified  in deviation form, this constant is zero, so that 
= ((P÷1) = e,(E,) = 0.  (6) 
Equations (1) - (6) describe the structure  of the two economies.  The policy  makers in these 
economies  are assumed  to take as benchmarks, the level of output in a frictonless economy,  one 
where wages and prices  are fully flexible and the labor market clears, As is shown in the Appendix, 
assuming that labor is immobile internationally, the output in such an economy,  responds  only to 
its own SUPPlY shocks.  In terms of the present notation this adjustment can be expressed as 
=kw  —kw  kw  (1+n) ci  (7)  1+ n+-i 
where n is the elasticity of  supply of  labor. The level of output fluctuates less than proportionately 
3 with the supply disturbance. Thus the respective  objective  functions  of the two policy  makers  are 
taken to be to minimize? 
fl,  E(Y, 
(8') 
These objective functions are assumed  to  be optimized through monetary policy.  whioh we 
assum.e can be conducted either by controlling the money supplies  or by eetting the interest rates.4 
Our concern  is to compare the alternative  approaches and to determine the cature  of the "mcnetary 
instrument" prnblem  confronting policy makers within a strategic cotsxt. To do this requires  us 
to obtain alternative reduced form solutions,  appropriate for each chcseo combination  of mcretary 
instruments. 
A.  Reduced Ferns Under Money Supply Instruments 
When both policy  makers use the nominal money supply as their respective monetary instru- 
ments, the solutions for Yt and 7,7  are 
Y = a(M  Vt)  o(M: 
— ufl + a,,u5  atv  Cw  (9) 
37 = <(M, 
— e,)+ a0(M 
— or) + a,u4 + Cia,  OnWi  (9') 
where 
_i'rds  1  ,  a  irdz  1  a=l—+1J>O; av=Lr_iJco 
= 2a1  > o,  a = (1 + a2)a,  > o, :  = (1 + Q2)a; < 
2DM  7  7 
DM  d2J1 + z  +  a57] + a3(1 
— d,) >0. 
4 S.  Reduced Form Under Intereat Rate Instrument 
When the nominal interest rates are  the policy  instruments used  by the pocy  maxers. :he 
money market equations (3) and (3') become irrelevant and the solutions for Y, and  Y, become 
= b1], + bI  + b,,u + bWt -  b,w  (IC) 
Y,. = br  + b1I -4-  -- bWt 
--- bw:  (10') 
where 
=  1) <0;  b =  —  - >0 
b=—2—>0 b=—>0-  b  =_L<0 
2D1 
— d1) + d2 > 0 
C.  Reduced Form Under Asymmetric  Choice  of Instruments 
With respect to asymmetric instrument choice,  it  suffices to consider the case where the 
domestic monetary authority chooses the money stock as  the policy variable while the foreign 
monetary authority sets the interest rate.  The reverse pairing  of instruments is analogous.  The 
solutions for Y and Y, now become: 
= c,,(M, 
— v,) + cI + cut +  + c,w  (11) 
(11') where 
= 2[2d2 +-i(1 
— d)i >0  C = —2(1 
— d) >0 
(1  hc 
c=-——>0;  c='  >0;  c=—--'<0 
'7 
=  2(_  d1) <0; e = —2[2d2(l  02  o)  + o2(1 
—  d1)] <0 
>0;  e=  <0;  e=——->u 
'7 
Space limitations  preclude a detalled discussion of  these reduced  formc. which in any event are 
straightfoard. However,  several  observations  are worth making. First, the impacts of exogenous 
shocks on the two economies  depend upon the chosen  monetary policy  choice,  Secondly,  in  the 
two cases of identical  instrument  choice, the symmetry  of the underlying economies is re6ected in 
the symmetry of the reduced form solutions. The cross country effects  of policy  on  outputs are 
negative. This is the "negative transmission" mechanism dating back to Mundell (1963) and which 
under PPP is at its most potent. Essentially,  a monetary expansion abroad say. leads to a nominal 
depreciation of the foreign  currency, ic, and appreciation of the domestic currency. This in turn 
leads to a decline in the domestic price level, as PFP is restored, leeding to a reduction in domestic 
output.  Finally, with asymmetric choice of instruments, this symmetry is lost. 
3.  DETERMrATION OF  STRATEGIC EQUILIBRIA 
We now determine  the strategic equilibrium  under alternative assumptions regarding the choice 
of monetary policy  instrument.  We do so under the assumption of Cournot behavior, in which 
each policy  maker takes the behavior of his rival as given, and we allow for both the money supply 
and the interest rate to serve as (alternative) policy instruments. Rather than discussing each case 
in turn, the general  approach is outlined. 
First, substitute for Y5 and Y  from the reduced forms and for the frictionless output levels 
from (7) into the welfare  functions (8), (8').  Taking  expected values,  in general these are 
seen to be quadratic functions of the form 
6 = (i,i,o)  (12) 
=  (i,i,o')  (12') 
where u  denotes the vector of  variances and covariances of the stochastic disturbances, Henceforth 
time subscripts are dropped and i,i, index the choice of policy  instruments in the domestic and 
foreign  economies, respectively.  Specifically, i = M, I, and i  = M, 1, giving rise to the four 
possible combinations of instrument choice. 
The optimality conditions  are obtained by minimizing  (12) with respect to i, (12') with respect 
to i  Under the assumption of Cournot behavior, this yields 
r13  äi  'ai•' 
Given the quadratic welfare  functions, these equations are linear in the  policy  instruments and 
define each country's reaction function, the slopes of which depend upon the policy  choice.  In a1 
cases,  since the random variables are independently distributed over  time,  the optimum calls for 
setting  = 1  = O(i = M,I;i = M',1). Substituting these values back into (12), (12') yields the 
minimized  welfare costs under the different regimes. 
4.  CHOICE OF MONETARY INSTRUMENT 
Table 1 summarizes  the minimized welfare  costs under the alternative instrument combinations 
in the form of a 2 x 2 payoff matrix for each country. The three parts of this table summarize the 
effects of:  (i) monetary; (ii) real demand; and (iii) supply disturbances, each taken in turn.  In all 
cases unit variances are assumed. The optimal choice of monetary instrument is defined to be the 
Nash equilibrium to this bimatrix game, in the sense that neither policy  maker has an incentive 
to switch unilaterally from this point.5 The three disturbances shall be discussed in turn. 
A.  Monetary  Disturbances 
Consider first domestic monetary disturbances. it is clear from A(i)  of the table that as long 
as the domestic monetary authority controls the domestic interest, thereby allowing the domestic 
7 money  supply to absorb fully tbe domestic monetary shock, output at home  and  abroad  will be 
stabilized perfectly,  irrespective of the  choice  of monetary instrument abroad.  Thos both  the 
/  — M  and  the I — I  instrument combinations represent Nash equilibria.  Moreover,  both are 
admissible in the sense that neither is dominated by the other. in terms of welfare costs. 
With a perfectly correlated worldwide  monetary disturbance, it is clear that  the I — P in- 
strument oombination is a Nash equilibrium, since  both countries allow their respective money 
supplies to absorb their monetary shocks, thereby perfectly  insulating the output  levels in the two 
economies.  This is a direct analogue  of Poole. It is clear that neither the M — P combination nor 
the P  — M combination can be a Nash equilibrium, since in either osse the policy  noaker control- 
lIng the money supply can be made better off by switching  to setting the interest rate.  But it ie 
interesting to note that it is possible for the M — M combmation to be a Ne3h equiiihrium. This 
will be so if and only if dr < -y( 
— d1)D.  While for plausible  parameter values this condition 
is unlikely to be met, it cannot he ruled out  (e.g.  if d2 = 0).  Basicaily, the negative interna- 
tional transmission of  monetary shocks means that the negative effects of domestic  money demand 
shocks  on domestic output are offset to some degree by the positive effects  of the corresponding 
movements  in the foreign disturbance. Under certain conditions these may be sufficiently large to 
eliminate the incentive for either policy  maker  to switch  unilaterally to setting the interest rate. 
in this case, when M — M  is a Nash equilibrium, it is generally  inferior  to both policy  makers 
setting their respective  interest rates. However, without cooperation,  neither policy maker has the 
incentive to make this switch. 
B.  Real Demand Disturbances 
These  ars straightforward.  Directly evsluating the terms appearing in the matrix,  we can 
establish b, > c;  Ou <  This  implies  that the only Nash equilibrium is the M — M policy 
combination. For any other policy  combination the policy  maker  setting the interest rate would 
have an incentive to switch unilaterally to setting the money supply. The intuition is the same as 
in Poole. By controlling the money supply, the monetary authority allows some of  the fluctuations 
in demand to be borne by the interest rate, thereby reducing the fluctuations in output. 
S C.  Supply Dt.turbances 
Supply disturbances give rise to fluctuations  in the frictionless  level of  output and we therefore 
mea.sure deviations in output about kw,kw,  where k =  <  I.  Turning  first to domestic 
disturbances,  we can  show  that e, > a,2;b,2 > c. It therefore follows that setting  its money 
supply dominates setting the interest rate insofar  as the foreign economy is concerned.  Intuitively, 
a positive shock in w5 raises Y, lowers P and hence foreign  output  Y"  If the foreign  monetary 
authority pegs the money  supply some of the fluctuations in the world output market are borne 
by the interest rate  .1  and less by Y; if t pegs I  the fluctuations are more fully borne by Y 
Given that the foreign economy  chooses  to set its money  stock, the optimal choice  in  the 
domestic  economy depends upon whether 
(a—e,)(a+e,—2k)  0.  (14) 
In fact, either inequality in (14) may hold, depending  upon parameter values. For example, suppose 
= .75,d  .5,a = 1,cs = .5,' = 1 are taken as reasonable values implying a.,,, = .573,e, = 
807.  In this case, the M — M" combination is chosen  if and  only  if k < .69, i.e., if and only if 
the elasticity of supply of labor n <  1.23;  otherwise,  the domestic authorities choose to set the 
interest rate, in which case the Nash equilibrium is the I — M  policy  combination. The  key to 
the choice here is which policy regime "tracks" the frictionless  output  level better. With n large, 
the frictionless output is more sensitive to domestic supply shocks.  For this particular parameter 
set this is more closely followed by setting I, but this is not true in all cases. 
Finally, C(ii) summarizes the welfare costs for  worldwide supply disturbances. In this case one 
can establish that both the M—M  and the I—I" policy combinations are Nash equilibria in that 
starting  from either, neither policy  maker has an incentive  to deviate unilaterally. However, one 
of the two equilibria can always be shown  to be superior. Which one it is, depends critically upon 
parameter values. For the above  set, M — M  is superior for n <  .538, while I — f  dominates 
for n >  .538.  Since  both  policy  makers have  symmetric welfare  costs in this case, there  is  no 
potential conflict in the choice  of these two  Nash equilibria.  But it is possible for the inferior 
Nash equilibrium  to be chosen and for the policy makers to be unable to coordinate their actions 
to attain the dominant outcome.  In this case, some form of communication between the policy 
9 makers, as suggested by Farrell (1987)  may induce the dominant Nash equhbrtum to be seiected. 
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
We have shown exactly how the optimai  choice of monetary instrument in two interdependent 
economies  is determined in two stages  First, for each pair of policy  instruments, the minimized 
welfare costs for each  economy are determined. This defines  a pair of payoff matrices and the second 
stage involves determining the Nash equilibrium  pair of instruments for this bimatrix game. 
To illustrate the procedure we have  chosen the simplest model of two symmetric economies. 
In  all cases a dominant Nash equilibrium has been  obtained  But it is possible, particularly with 
asymmetric economies,  for no equilibrium in pure strategies to exist.  In such cases  there will 
always he a solution in mixed strategies.  This will involve each policy  maker switching  between 
the two  instruments with probabilities determined by the game.  It is also pcasibie  for  multiple 
Nash equilibria to exist in which there are conflicts with respect to the welfares for the two agents. 
In this case the outcome may not be an equilibrium  one unless there is some form of cooperation. 
These are interesting issues and merit further consideration. 
10 APPENDIX 
DERIVATION OF EQUATION (7) OF TEXT 
The derivations for the domestic  and foreign  economies -e analogous  and we shall  focos  on 
the former. Suppose that output  is specified by the Cobb—Douglas production fun :zon, exDressed 
logarithmically  by 
Al, 
where  s a productivity shock and  N1 denotes the logarithm of employment  The demand for 
labor under frictionless  conditions, N is determmed by the marginal prodoct condton 
1A2' 
where W denotes the logarithm of the nominal wage rate, while the supply  of labor. N'  under 
similar conditions is 
(A.3) 
Assuming  that labor is immobile internationally,  labor market clearance in the domestic  economy, 
characteristic of the frictionlees economy,  implies 
d  —. 
—  nln(1—8)  vs 
N = N =  =  + — 
1+nB  1+nG 
so that output in the frictionlesa  economy is 
—  n(1—9)ln(I—G)  1+n 
1+nU 
Now, the aggregate supply function (5) being assumed throughout the analysis, can be derived 
from the production function (A.1) if  wages, instead of being perfectly flexible, are assumed  to be 
determined by a one period contract, at a level such that the domestic labor market is expected to 
clear.  The argument, familiar for a small open economy, applies directly to a large open economy 
-  11 in which labor is immobile  internationally, as is being  assumed  in this case  and  w1 appearing 
in (5)  are related to 8 and e appearing in (Al) by 
1—9 
Wtw-j.  (AS) 
Substituting for 9 and e from (A.5)  into (A.4), and carrying Out the same procedure for the foreign 
economy, the adjustments in the domestic and foreign frictionless  economies expressed in deviation 
form are respectively 
'kw, k11  (A.6) 
which is (7) of the text. 
12 Table  \  clfare Losses 
A. (i)  Domcstic Moncary Dsturbancc [  = 
Domestic  Economy  Feign Fcnom 
ti'  t!  f 
M  T0 
IOO  1  0  0: 
1—M', I—1 are ash eçuiiibria 
A. (ii) Worldwide Monetary  Disturbance [a  =  = 
11 
Domestic Economy  Foreign Economy 
1' 
(a, + a)2  4, + a,)2 
I  h—;- 
I—! is a Nash equilibriurn.  M—M  is a Nash equilibrium  if and only if d2 <-i(l 
— 
B.  Output Demand  Disturbance [  = 1] 
Domestic Economy  Foreign Economy 
4f*  J  %f  r 
1T  I_ 
M—W  is Nash Equilibrium C. (i)  Domcctic Supply Disturmcc  =  11 
Domestic Economy  Forcin Eouorn 
iI1  ET 
?!  (a, —k)  (c,  k)2 
j 
(e -  k )2  (b -  k  )2  i  b2 
M—M  or i—M  is Nash equilibrium  according to whether 
(a, 
— e)(a +  — 2k)  0; either case is possible. 
C. (ii)  Worldwide Supply Disturbance [o =  =  =  1 
Domestic Economy  Foreign Economy 
:: :::::  ::: :E::  ______ 
M—M, 1—!' are Nash equilibria FOOTNOTES 
We are grateful to Matthew Canzoneri and the referee for their suggestions. 
tThis is similar to Hamada's (1979) approach to deterrn.ning .nernalional  monetary arraoge- 
ments as  a two—stage game.  In the first stage the rules are set; ifl  the second, the pOcies  are 
determined for the chosen set of rules. 
2For  examples of  such models see some of the papers in Bhandari (l985. 
3The objective functions (8), (8') are well known to have desirabie welfare properties: see e.g 
A.izenrnan and Frenkel (1985) 
4Our analysis follows the usual monetary instrument  terature by  restrIcting the choe oZ 
alternative monetary instruments to the  money  stock and the interest rate.  This restrict.on  IS 
somewhat arbitrary, since the monetary authorities can choose to control other aggregates  as weli. 
There are also other ways of conducting monetary policy  such  as  adustng  the money  stock to 
peg the price Level.  While this would be optimal in the face of aggregate demand shocks u anc 
monetary shocks v,v, it would  be an inappropriate policy  for dealing  with supply shocks.  In any 
event, the approach of this paper can be adapted to analyzing an extended range of monetary 
policy  instruments. 
tOne minor point is the familiar observation that under rational expectations, pegg1ng the 
interest rate leads to an indeterminate mean price level,  This is not serious, since the  analysis 
focuses on  deviations about equilibrium.  Furthermore, the indeterminacy can be resolved by 
simultaneously setting a corresponding mean level for the money supply 
6For a discussion of Nash equilibrium in a bimatrix game  see e.g.  Basar and Olsder (l982. 
Frequently, a game may have more than one such equilibrium. In such cases a Nash equilibrium is 
said to be admissible if it is not dominated by some other equilibrium which yields higher payoffs 
to both agents. It is also possible for the bimatrix game to admit more than one admissible  Nash 
equilibrium, in which case the equilibrium outcome becomes rather ill—defined  and may  involve 
conflicts; see Baser and Olader for further discussion. 
7These values are typical of those used in numerical simulation studies; see e.g.  Miller  and 
Salmon (1985), Oudiz and Sacha  (1985), Turnovaky  and d'Orey  (1986). 8See e.g.  Turnovsky (1984) for the derivation in the ce  of a small open economy. REFERENCES 
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